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The optimal design of health insurance policies is a major challenge for many
governments. Such policies must make trade-offs between risk sharing on the one hand
and agency problems on the other. A central theme in insurance is that increasing the
generosity  allows for a better dispersion of risks but also leads to higher expenditures
because individuals are induced to consume more care. A similar theme is at work in the
relationship between governments and health care insurers. The more generous the
government subsidizes health care plans the weaker are the incentives for the insurers
to undertake efficiency activities and the higher health care expenditures will be (see
also Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) and Newhouse (1996)).
Traditionally, health care insurers are considered to play two different roles. First of
all, they supply insurance contracts, which serve to reduce the variability of financial
outcomes due to medical risks by pooling a large number of people. Second, health care
insurers should play a role as countervailing power to the suppliers of medical services.
Especially in the field of medical care where asymmetric information contributes to a
dominant position of suppliers, insurers may be better equipped than patients to bargain
for a high quality of medical services at low cost.
For a long time, the organization of health care insurance in many countries
concentrated on the first of these two aspects. For example, in the Netherlands, health
care insurance for basic cure services such as services delivered by general practitioners,
medical specialists and pharmaceuticals is administered by a large number of sickness
funds. These sickness funds were used to operate under a scheme of full cost
reimbursement: for each guilder paid to their insured, sickness funds received a guilder
from the sponsor of the scheme, i.e. the Dutch government.
Recently, things have begun to change. Since 1992, Dutch government policies aim
at a gradual reduction of reimbursement rates. These policies aim to induce insurers to
undertake actions that raise the efficiency of the delivery of medical services. Thus,
insurers should pay more attention to their role of countervailing power party instead
of their role of supplier of health care insurance.
Although our paper will concentrate on the Netherlands, more countries employ
similar reimbursement and/or risk adjustment schemes. In the United States, the Federal
government announced in 1999 its intentions to employ risk adjustment to pay HMO’s
that enroll individuals in medicare (Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000)). In other countries
(e.g. Israel and Colombia) risk adjustment premium subsidies are such that community-
rated premiums should be zero for all enrollees (See Van de Ven and Ellis (2000)). 
This paper explores the effects of (im)perfect risk adjustment schemes and the effects
of two types of reimbursement schemes, retrospective equalization and retrospective
compensation, that characterize the financing of Dutch sickness funds. It analyses the6
2 The model is part of a larger modelling project which covers the complete Dutch health care sector. See
CPB(1999) for an overview of this project.
effects of these schemes on the efficient delivery of medical services and on health care
premiums. It finds that policies that foster competition among sickness funds not only
increase the efficiency that features the delivery of medical services but also may
increase risk-type specific selection activities by insurers. Furthermore, it finds that
premiums are influenced by several opposite effects. Hence, the recent policy shift in
the Netherlands may be a mixed blessing. Whether it is beneficial or harmful depends
on the exact working of the several institutions in the playing field.
The paper adopts a static model that fully integrates the behaviour of insurers with
that of consumers of health care services, i.e. patients, the Dutch government and the
providers of care. Insurers have a number of instruments at their disposal to influence
outcomes. In particular, they can choose the intensity of efficiency activities and
selection activities. In addition, they can set their premiums. Our model recognizes the
heterogeneity of consumers observed in reality by distinguishing high and low risks (as
is done in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)). Furthermore, high and low risks may face
different premium and selection elasticities. Insurers can explore selection activities
separately for the two groups of risks. However, legally they are not allowed to risk
differentiate their premiums. 
 The model is inspired by the overview of Van de Ven and Ellis (2000).
2 The model
is related to the models in Chalkley and Malcomson (1998a, 1998b) and Ellis (1998) and
Ellis and McGuire (1990). Whereas most of these models use an integrated approach for
modeling  the health care insurer and the health care provider, we make an explicit
distinction between these two types of institutions. Surprisingly enough there are no
models in the health care literature which take the perspective of the health care insurer
as point of departure, who has to cope with at least four different actors simultaneously:
the consumers, the government, the health care provider and other insurers. Besides
price competition among insurers we also consider the possibility of (risk-) selection
competition among insurers and, furthermore, model the consequences of competition
on the efficiency in the provision of care. In our model the government has also a
prominent role, since we model explicitly a prospective and two retrospective payment
schemes. This enables us to study the consequences of risk adjustment and reimbursing
health plans on the trade-off efficiency in production versus selection (Newhouse
(1996)). The literature lacks, as far as we know, an explicit model of these phenomena.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the institutional background
by describing the reimbursement schemes of Dutch sickness funds. Section 3 sets out
the formal model. Section 4 explains the outcomes of the model in the Nash equilibrium.7
3 This element is not central in a scheme of regulated competition however. Indeed income solidarity can
also be achieved in other ways, like through the tax system.
Section 5 discusses various assumptions of the model and section 6 contains concluding
remarks.
        
2. Sickness funds in the Netherlands
Figure 1 shows the public scheme for health insurance as administered by sickness funds
in the Netherlands. This public scheme regulates insurance for those with labour income
below a certain threshold (about 30.000 euro). Insurance is obligatory for those who are
eligible and covers about two-third of the Dutch population (about 10 million people).
The scheme covers health expenditure on basic cure services like for example hospital
care, care delivered by general practicioners and pharmaceuticals. It is administered by
a large number of independent sickness funds (28 in 1999). Consumers are allowed to
switch yearly from insurer to another, and acceptance is obligatory. Each consumer
faces equal benefit packages, as designed by the government, and  two types of
premiums: a basic premium and a community-rated premium.
 The basic premium is uniform across sickness funds and is a function of income of
the insured. This contributes to income solidarity.
3 In figure 1 these payments reflect the
solidarity contributions of the consumer to the sponsor, i.e. the Dutch government. The
sponsor collects the solidarity contributions of consumers and reimburses these
contributions across sickness funds. The sponsor splits these reimbursements into a
prospective and retrospective part.
Figure 1 The health insurance system as administered by Dutch sickness funds.8
4 In the Netherlands a distinction is made between four categories: variable costs of hospital care, fixed
costs of hospital care, medical specialists and other health provisions. Each category has its own form of risk
sharing.
￿ Risk adjusted prospective payments
For each enrollee an insurer receives prospective payments which depends on the risk
characteristics of the enrollee, i.e., the sponsor performs risk adjustment. Risk
adjustment implies that the sponsor uses consumer information to calculate the expected
health care expenditures of individual consumers. The idea is that the better the match
is between risk characteristics and insurer reimbursements, the less incentives sickness
funds will have to apply risk-selection. Currently, the risk-adjusted payments equals the
risk-adjusted predicted per capita costs at the national level minus a fixed amount that
is identical for all persons (see Van de Ven and Ellis (2000)). Risk adjusters that are
used include age, sex, disablement and region-characteristics of the consumer.
Prospective payments cover only a part of the realised health care costs and control
only very imperfectly for risk differentials between different insurers. Currently, the
risk-adjusters on which the prospective payment scheme is based explain only about 10
percent of the variation in health care costs (van Vliet et al., 1999). Hence, without any
retrospective element, insurers that are unlucky to have a high proportion of bad-risk
consumers, would face higher losses. Moreover, any existing information gap about
individual health characteristics of the consumers between the insurers and the
government might induce insurers to apply risk-selection. Therefore, sickness funds
receive also retrospective payments.
4 Two types of payments are distinguished.
￿ Retrospective equalization
Retrospective equalization is a form of risk sharing among insurers. The idea is to
compensate losses of insurers by gains of other insurers. For example, at the end of the
year it may become visible that realised health care costs are unevenly distributed across
insurers, due to failures in the risk adjustment scheme of the sponsor or simply due to
bad luck of some insurers. The exact percentage of the amount of losses or gains which
will be equalized is determined each year by the sponsor. Retrospective equalization is
budget neutral and, therefore, involves no extra sponsor subsidies to the insurers.  
￿ Retrospective compensation 
Retrospective compensation  implies that the sponsor additionally subsidizes part of the
difference between realised health care costs and the prospective and retrospective
equalization payments. This payments scheme compensates high-cost insurers more
than low-cost insurers.9
So far we have explained the upper part of figure 1; basic premiums of the consumer
flow through the sponsor to the health insurer. The main point is that these flows are
regulated by the sponsor. This enables the sponsor to introduce all types of solidarity
issues into the insurance system, such as risk and income solidarity across consumers
and cost solidarity across insurers.
However, in order to stimulate insurers to implement more efficient activities to
control costs, the Dutch government introduced, about eight years ago, elements of
regulated competition into the system. This is visible in the lower part of figure 1.
Health insurers are also allowed to raise community-rated premiums.
Community-rated premiums are set by individual sickness funds. However, sickness
funds are not allowed to differentiate across different risk categories. All enrollees
contracted by the same insurer pay identical community-rated premiums. Community-
rated premiums have to be paid by the enrollee directly to the insurer. Since community-
rated premiums are allowed to differ across insurers, insurers can use this premium to
attract consumers. This element of price competition is expected to increase efficiency
efforts of insurers. The argument is that less efficient insurers will produce higher costs
and, therefore, will have to set higher community-rated premiums than  efficient
insurers. Consumers will choose their most favourable insurer since they are allowed to
change from their insurer yearly. Other people argue that efficiency activities will not
get off the ground, for example due to the strong bargaining position of health care
providers, and that insurers will increase their selection activities to attract more
profitable consumers.
In the next section the above plan will be modelled explicitly. The model is built from
the perspective of the health care insurer who may pursue efficiency and selection
activities and in setting a community-rated premium. The underlying assumptions of the
model are that insurers face price and (risk-) selection competition and have full
information (i.e. and possibly more information than the government) when determining
their optimal behaviour.
3.  The model
The model considers a population of x consumers, who differ with respect to their
medical risk. We distinguish a population of low risks, xL , and a population of high
risks, xH. We assume that there are N insurers in the health care market. Each insurer
i￿{1,..,N }attracts xi consumers of which some are low risk consumers, xiL , and some
are high risk consumers, xiH:
x :' ￿
N
i￿1 xi :' ￿
N
i￿1 xiL % ￿
N
i￿1 xiH:' xL % xH    (1)10
5 We follow here the definition of Newhouse (1996). Efficiency in production refers to least cost
treatment of a patient’s medical problem, holding quality constant. 
6 It may also correspond to general quality activities of insurers such as services. Note that dumping is
not possible; the whole population has to be ensured by law. Furthermore, the model does not consider
skimping (i.e. reducing  quality of medical treatment by providers for profit reasons). 
Insurers are obliged to accept any person who wants to enter. Hence x, xL and xH are
given for insurer i. Insurers have the disposal of the following instruments:
￿ Each insurer i may invest in efficiency activities, ei , by inducing health care providers
to keep costs down without stinting on quality of service.
5 
￿ Each insurer i is allowed to choose a community-rated premium, pi. This premium
may differ across insurers but is equal for every, low or high risk, enrollee contracted
by insurer i.   
￿ Each insurer i may explore two types of selection activities. Selection activities on
low risk types, siL, and on high risk types, siH . Selection activities may correspond to all
type of activities to attract consumers, such as marketing activities or less ethical
selection activities such as creaming (see Ellis (1998)).
6
3.1. Health care costs
Health care costs differ among consumer-type. We assume that for each type of
consumer, the insurer faces the following health care costs:   








j ),          (2)
for k=H,L,  i, j =1,...,N, 0￿￿k , 0￿￿￿N-1 , 0<￿<1.
This equation postulates that health care costs for an enrollee of risk type k belonging
to insurer i equals  . Health care costs depends on two terms: zik
￿ Fixed costs  
The fixed costs   are assumed only to depend on the type of risk and are equal for all z
0
k
insurers. In the absence of efficiency activities,  low risk enrollees will be assumed less





￿ Efficiency and health care costs
Carrying out efficiency activities, ei , lowers health care costs for each consumer. The
impact of efficiency activities upon health care costs will depend on ￿k ,￿ and ￿. These
parameters reflect the institutional setting of insurers. ￿k indicates to what extent11
7 Although the impact of efficiency may differ for different risk types it is not allowed for the insurer to
differentiate efficiency activities across different risk types. We assume that health care providers follow their
ethical code and treat patients on basis of their diagnosis and independent of the fact whether they are low
or high risks. 
8 There is still a large dispute going on here. Glied (2000) summarizes empirical research on managed
care. She concludes that managed care plans reduce the rate of health care utilization somewhat. Less
evidence, however, exists on their effect on overall health care costs and cost growth. A recent study of
Altman, Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000) finds that treatment intensity differs hardly between HMO’s and an
indemnity plan, but HMO’s charge a lower price.
efficiency activities may yield different gains for high and low risks.
7 ￿ reflects the
spillover gains of efficiency activities of  insurers. For example in a situation where a
hospital provides similar services to consumers of different insurers, spillover effects
are likely to occur since health care providers are not likely to distinguish enrollees of
different insurers. If  efficiency activities of an insurer have a substantial impact on
health care costs of enrollees of other insurers then ￿ is closer to N-1. This situation is
typical for an environment where consumers have a large freedom of choice with respect
to health care providers, irrespective of their choice of insurer.  However, at the other
extreme, there are independent (HMO type of) insurers, who explore their own
hospitals, specialists and general practitioners. In such an institutional setting ￿ will be
much smaller, but ￿k may be higher. If the ties among health care insurers and health
care providers are more intense and exclusive, building up efficiency activities are likely
to be more fruitful and may be less costly.
8 The extreme case here is ￿=0. This
corresponds to a situation where insurers and health care providers are completely
vertically integrated. Remark that the impact of ￿ is divided by the number of insurers
minus one. This choice is arbitrary and mainly simplifies the presentation of outcomes.
It takes care of the fact that health care costs of a consumer are independent of the
number of insurers, if each insurer aims for an equal amount of efficiency activities.
Finally, ￿ is assumed to be between 0<￿<1, indicating that marginal efficiency activities
are decreasing in the intensity of efficiency behaviour.  
In the above equation we implicitly assume that efficiency activities of the insurer
may reduce health care costs. More explicit models of the relationship between insurer
and health care providers are numerous in the literature. Chalkley and Malcomson
(1998) use contract theory, in the style of Laffont and Tirole (1993), and take also the
consequences for quality of services into account. Ellis (1998) and Ellis and McGuire
(1990) consider different payment systems for the provider and model explicitly the
bargaining situation between the health care provider and the patient. 12
9 If insurers and health care providers are integrated then the distance to the provider may play a crucial
role for the consumer. Therefore Ellis (1998) considers also travel time. However, travel time plays a much
smaller role if consumers may choose their provider irrespective of their choice of insurer. The latter
resembles more the case in the Netherlands.   
10 The plausibilty of this reasoning should follows from the fact that in our model all consumers are
equal, except with respect to their medical risk. For example, it is not inconsistent with a recent empirical
3.2. Attracting consumers
We assume that an insurer attracts consumers on basis of their premium and their
selection activities.
9 We assume that the more selection activities (in high or low risk)
undertakes or the lower the insurer sets the premium, the more consumers will be










jk)        (3)
for k = L,H,  i, j =1,...,N , 0< ￿, ￿k , ￿k <1.
The equations shows that insurers compete with three different type of instruments
to attract consumers. Insurers can attract low-risk type consumers by undertaking
selection activities siL, or high risk types by undertaking selection activities siH . The third
instrument to attract consumers is the community-rated premium pi. The equation posits
that insurers can undertake selection activities as a substitute for premium adjustments.
We will now explain each term in the equation separately.
￿ The constant term. 
If selection activities across insurers are equal, siL = sjL and siH  = sjH  for i,j￿{1,...,N }, and
also community-rated premiums are equal across insurers, pi = pj , we assume that each





the equation is constructed such that for any choice of siL, s iH  or  pi the sum
= x always holds. ￿
N
i￿1 ￿k￿H,L xik
￿ Community-rated premiums 
Everything else equal, if the premium of insurer i is higher than the average premium
of the other insurers, insurer i will lose market share on the insurance market. A one unit
change of the community-rated premium implies that a share ￿L of the population of risk
type L (and a share ￿H  of the population risk type H) will change from insurer. Low- and
high risks may react differently on premium changes as is reflected in different shares
￿L and ￿H. For example, high risks may attach more weight to their health status, and
thus may generate a higher search intensity, than low risks.
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study of Beeson Royalty and Solomon (1999), who found lower price elasticities for specific groups of
people, such as older workers, employees with longer tenure, and enrollees who insure a family member with
a chronical medical condition.
￿ Selection activities
Given equal premiums among insurers, the equations in (3) specify that more low (high)
risks consumers are attracted if selection activities siL (siH ) of insurer i are higher than
the average amount of selection activities of the other insurers. The amount of
consumers an insurer will attract depends on the parameters ￿k and ￿. For example, a
low ￿k or ￿ implies that consumers are insensitive to these type of activities. ￿L  and ￿H
may differ. Again, different type of risks may react differently on similar type of
selection activities. Everything else equal, high risks are likely to react more sensitively
than low risks to health care activities arranged by insurers. We assume 0<￿<1, which
indicates that selection activities feature decreasing returns to scale.
Note that premiums are modelled through a linear relationship, whereas changes in
selection activities are modelled as decreasing returns to scale. This choice has
important consequences for the final outcomes. It is made to keep the model analytically
tractable and, moreover, yields a unique  Nash equilibrium. 
3.3.  The role of the sponsor
As we have discussed in section two, the sponsor collects solidarity  contributions from
the consumers. Considering the viewpoint of the insurers, they will receive prospective
and retrospective payments from the sponsor. 
3.3.1. Prospective  payments
The prospective payments, bi , are modelled as follows
              
bi ' biL % biH ' µLxiL % µHxiH ,   (4)
for i = 1,...,N, 0< µL < µH .
For each enrollee insurers receive a lump sum subsidy depending on its risk
characteristics. For a low risk enrollee an insurer receives µL and for a high risk enrollee
µH . We assume that subsidies for high risks are higher than for low risks.
A description of the retrospective payments is more complicated. Assume that (e.g.
after a year) the realised total health care costs for each insurer is known. Then, first
retrospective equalization, and next, retrospective compensation takes place by the14
sponsor. The sponsor calculates the retrospective payments by taking into account the
realised health care costs and the prospective payments.
3.3.2. Retrospective equalization
If the realised health care costs for insurer i are
ci  ciL  ciH  ziLxiL  ziHxiH ,          (5)
then, after subtracting the prospective payments, each insurer faces health care costs of
ci - bi. In the sequel we will call this difference between medical costs and prospective













,            (6)
for i =1,...,N and 0￿￿ ￿1.
The first term, bi , are the prospective payments from the sponsor and the second
term represents the amount due to retrospective equalization. The first term between
brackets reflects the average net costs of the ith insurer per enrollee. The last term
between brackets denotes average net costs per enrollee, where the average is taken over
all insurers. Since the average is taken over the sum of low and high risks together the
specification allows for cross-subsidies between low and high risks. If insurer i’s
average net costs are above total average net costs, the ith insurer will receive from the
sponsor this difference times his number of enrollees times the equalization parameter
￿. If insurers net costs are below average the insurer has to pay a similar amount to the
sponsor. Retrospective equalization is thus a zero-sum activity: the payments made by
low-cost insurers compensate exactly the subsidies to high-cost insurers. Since
retrospective equalization is budget neutral for the sponsor it is often called a form of
risk sharing among insurers.
3.3.3. Retrospective compensation








i ),              (7)15
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i        (8)
for  i =1,...,N and 0￿￿￿1.
According to this expression, insurer i receives (pays) an additional subsidy if, after
equalization, the operating profit is negative (positive). In this formula the sponsor
payments to the insurer, after equalization, are enlarged (reduced) with a fraction of the
realised losses (profits). This fraction 0￿￿￿1 is determined, together with the
equalization parameter, ￿, every year by the sponsor. In contrast to retrospective
equalization, retrospective compensation is not budget neutral.
3.3.4. Solidarity  premiums
The sponsor finances its payments by levying premiums that are related to income of
consumers, but unrelated to their medical risk. As our model does not distinguish
consumers, with respect to income, this amounts to a flat solidarity premium by
consumers. The premium per consumer that balances the budget of the government is





Total consumer premiums sum premiums to the sponsor and premiums paid to the
insurer. Hence, the expression for total premiums per consumer reads as follows:
Note that the premium  differs for consumers who bought their health insurance from p
c
i
different insurance companies due to the fact that community-rated premiums may
differ. The premium  is considered a measure of consumer welfare. p
c
i
3.4. The profit and objective function of the insurer
We define the profit function of insurer i as follows:
Wi  b
￿￿
i  pixi (ziLxiL  ziH xiH)(siL  siH) ei         (9)
for i=1,...,N.
This profit function, Wi,  subtracts total costs from total returns. Negative entries are
realised health care costs of the low and high risks (ziL xiL + ziH xiH), the investment costs
in selection for low and high risks (siL + siH ) and the investment costs in efficiency
activities (ei). Positive entries are the subsidies from the sponsor b
**
i and community-
rated premiums collected directly from the consumer (pi xi ).16
11 Besides profits, other objectives may have played (and may still play) an important role. There may
be a social objective such as aiming at a desired level of care. See Schut (1995), for a historical overview of
the Dutch insurance market.
Although making profits from medical insurance is an important objective, we must
not ignore the fact that many insurance companies operated for a long time under full
cost reimbursement.
11 An insurance company may also want to attract consumers to
make (additional) profits on supplementary, or other type of, insurance. Cross-selling
may be an important issue here. Attracting more consumers means also more status (and
thus bargaining power) by becoming a big player in the field of health insurance. More
consumers makes it also possible for insurers to make larger investments in risk-share
capital. Furthermore, a risk averse insurer may want to attract more enrollees to reduce
the variation of its expected health care costs.
We model this latter aspect by defining an objective function, Vi , in which besides
profits the insurer maximizes the number of enrollees. The maximization problem is
now defined as:                                                                                                                
                                           
Maxei, siL, siH, pi Vi  Wi   xi ,       (10)
where 0￿￿. Note that if ￿ = 0, then insurers fully maximize their profits from medical
insurance. 
We assume that insurers act rationally and optimize the objective function with
respect to the four instruments, assuming a Nash equilibrium between insurers. 
3.5. Solution mechanism
Technically the optimization problem results in N objective functions and 4N
instruments to optimize. We compute the first-order conditions by substituting equation
(1)-(7) in the objective function  Vi , i=1,...,N. This yields Vi (e1 ,...,eN , s1L , ...,sNL , s1H ,
...,sNH  , p1 ,..., pN). Next, we compute for  i=1,...,N: ￿Vi /￿ei =0, ￿Vi /￿siL =0, ￿Vi /￿siH =0,
￿Vi /￿pi =0, given the actions of the other insurers. This yields a closed system of 4 times
N equations, which can be solved. This will result in a Nash equilibrium. To obtain an
analytical solution we assume symmetry between insurers. The symmetry argument
implies that x
0
iL:= xL /N and x
0
iH:=xH /N. Furthermore, in equilibrium the optimal
outcomes   are equal for all insurers i=1,...,N. Inspection of the ˆ ei ,ˆ siL ,ˆ siH ,ˆ pi17
12 Here we do not go deeper into the analytical computations which are rather lengthy and cumbersome.
One can show that the Nash equilibrium produces a unique internal solution for a given range of parameter
values, which are obtained by computing the second order conditions of the maximization problem. These
computations can be retrieved by the author upon request.
13 The fact that the impact of equalization equals  can be understood by rewriting (1￿￿(1￿1/N￿￿/N))
the term between brackets in equation (6). In contrast with retrospective compensation, retrospective
equalization always yields some marginal return. Compare the two exteme cases: {2=1, <=0} and {2=0,
<=1} In the first case marginal returns from investing in efficiency is zero, whereas in the latter marginal
returns depend on 1/ N+$/N.
ˆ e : ˆ e1 ...ˆ eN  
N






1￿γ  (11)     
         
corresponding second-order conditions (not shown here) reveals that the system of first
order conditions indeed depicts a maximum.
12 
4. Explaining the Nash equilibrium of the model
In this section we describe and explain the Nash equilibrium of the problem. In the
following sections we will describe the optimal Nash rule for each instrument in turn
and discuss derived terms such as insurer profits and total consumer premiums.
4.1. Optimal efficiency rules
The optimal investment rule for efficiency activities by insurers reads as follows:
From this equation, it follows that optimal efficiency investments ( ) decrease with N. ˆ e
The larger the number of insurers, the fewer enrollees are available for each insurer.
Hence, the smaller are the gains from pursuing medical efficiency and the fewer
efficiency activities will be carried out. Efficiency investments are increasing
in and ￿. Like before, the more enrollees xL (or xH ), the higher the profits HxH  LxL
from an extra unit of efficiency. A similar reasoning holds for ￿L (or ￿H ) and ￿. The
higher the rate of retrospective compensation ￿, the smaller the gains that an individual
insurer receives from pursuing medical efficiency. This results in lower efficiency
activities by the insurer.
The term  is of special interest.
13 Since, in a Nash equilibrium (1&￿ (1& 1/N& ￿/N ))
we assume the actions of the other insurers as given, an insurer knows that possible
losses will be covered by other insurers. The higher the equalization parameter ￿ the
more an insurer will be covered by other insurers and thus the less risk an insurer bares.18
Equalization implies in most cases cost solidarity across insurers which is a glaring
contrast with competition. A remarkable result is that the more spillover effects between
insurers are in place (the higher ￿), the lesser equalization has an impact on efficiency
activities. The reason is that if an insurer undertakes efficiency activities then all
insurers will profit from these activities. Due to these profits less money has to be split
up across insurers. In the extreme case ￿=N-1 efficiency gains are equal for every
insurer and, thus, the impact of retrospective equalization is zero.
Substituting the optimal efficiency rules in equation (2) generates realised health care
costs:
        
ˆ zk : ˆ zi,k  z
0
k  k (1 )ˆ e γ ,        (12)
for k=H,L and i =1,...,N. 
We define also net realised health care costs per risk type. These costs subtract the
prospective payments of the sponsor from the realised health care costs:
¯ zk : ˆ zk  µk,        (13)
for k=H,L.
4.2. Optimal selection rules
In the Nash equilibrium, the following selection rules, for low and high risks, are
optimal







% (1&￿)(1&￿) ￿H(¯ zH & ¯ zL )
1
1￿￿
        (14)







% (1&￿)(1&￿) ￿L(¯ zL & ¯ zH )
1
1￿￿
        (15)
for i =1,...,N.
Although we make a distinction between selection activities for low and high risks,
this does not mean that general selection activities, intended for low and high risks
simultaneously and which do not discriminate among risk types, are not incorporated19
14 Examples of general selection activities are the placement of a bilboard with only the name of the
insurance company or an improvement of services of the insurance company.
15 We discuss here only directions and do not answer the question how the insurer divides  ˆ sL￿ ˆ sH
between general selection activities and risk type specific selection activities. This depends also on factors
outside the model.    
in the model.
14 The costs of general selection activities may fall for a part under and ˆ sL
for the remaining part under  . How large these parts are may depend on the ˆ sH
distribution of high (xH ) and low risks (xL) in the population. The first terms between
the inside brackets (1/xH and 1/xL) in equation (14) and (15) may determine the size of
the two parts.
We start with discussing the case  , =  and   . In this case high and ￿L'￿H ￿L ￿H ¯ zH¯ zL
low risks are similar for an insurer and we assume that an insurer will undertake only
general selection activities; the costs of general selection activities are  + . As ˆ sL ˆ sH
discussed before,  and  may be different because the distribution of high and low ˆ sL ˆ sH
risks may differ. General selection activities will increase if the scale of the insurer
increases (x/N has a positive effect on both   and    in (14) and (15)). The size of ˆ sL ˆ sH
general selection activities is also related to the substitution effect, implied by equation
(3), between investing in selection or attracting consumers by changing the premium.
The more consumers are less sensitive to price (the lower  ) and the more ￿LxL%￿HxH
sensitive they are towards selection activities (higher ￿ and/or higher  ,  simulta- ￿L ￿H
neously) then general selection activities are increasing as well. 
Risk-type specific selection activities, i.e. that discriminate among risk types, such
as exploring marketing activities or concentrate advertisements only on the favourable
risks (also called cream skimming or cherry picking) come into the picture if one of the
equalities  , = , and   does not hold. We consider now one inequality at ￿L'￿H ￿L ￿H ¯ zH¯ zL
a time (and for reasons of exposition assume that the other two equalities still hold).
If  then low (high) risks are more price elastic than high (low) risks. However, ￿L￿￿H
as long as both risks have equal net costs ( ) there is no need for the insurer to ¯ zH¯ zL
undertake risk-type specific selection activities. General selection activities however
may change due to the substitution effect, as described above. 
If  then low (high) risks are more sensitive to selection activities than high ￿L￿￿H
(low) risks. It is therefore profitable for the insurer to concentrate more on the low
(high) risks. This aspect distinguishes risk-type specific selection activities from general
selection activities. The larger the difference between  and   is, the more risk type ￿L ￿H
specific selection activities will take place (and the less general selection activities will
take place).
1520
16 Theoretically, two types of bad risks can be distinguished. Risks which are simply bad in the sense that
they are less profitable than high risks and risks which are really bad in the sense that they imply losses for
the insurer. In the latter case, the optimal selection rule towards bad risks may even become negative. Note,
however, that this latter possibility does not satisfy the second order conditions of the Nash equilibrium.
17  For example, if an insurance company chooses to place a bilboard on the the street with young healthy
people on the background then this choice may be due to the fact that young healthy people are good risks.
However, it may also be due to the fact that young healthy people react more sensitively to these
advertisements. The size of risk-type specific selection activities (or the number of bilboards on the streets)
depends also on the price elasticities of these people and of the type of prospective and retrospective
payments the government applies.
If   then we have a situation where the sponsor performs imperfect risk ¯ zH¯ zL
adjustment. First we discuss, however, the case of  , i.e. the sponsor performs ¯ zH¯ zL
perfect risk adjustment. In that case in equation (14) and (15), the last term equals zero.
Perfect risk adjustment by the sponsor implies that prospective payments price the
heterogeneity of different risks perfectly. Since net health care costs are exactly equal
for high and low risks, insurers are indifferent with respect to medical risk to insuring
one type of risk or the other. Thus, discriminating between the two types of risk with
respect to medical risk makes no sense. Note however that   and ¯ zH  {ˆ zH µH}
may be different from zero. Hence, sponsor subsidies may deviate a lot ¯ zL  {ˆ zL µL}
from health care costs, as long as the deviations for the two types of risks are equal. 
We now return to the case  . In that case net health care costs for high (low) ¯ zH¯ zL
risks are higher than for low (high) risks. The larger this difference the more    and ˆ sL ˆ sH
will deviate from each other and thus the more risk-type specific selection activities will
occur.
16 Note that the size of the price elasticities  and  plays a role as well in the ￿L ￿H
ultimate size of risk-type specific selection activities. For example consider the case
where the low risks are the good risks (  ). If now the price elasticity of high risks ¯ zH>¯ zL
increases, it becomes even more attractive for an insurer to concentrate on low risks.
Besides the fact that low risks are more profitable, for medical reasons, they will also
change less quickly from insurer once they are contracted.
Note that our selection equations perfectly show how complicated it will be in
practice to isolate the various reasons why insurance companies undertake, for example,
selective advertisement strategies. Besides the size of (unpriced) risk heterogeneity
many other aspects play an important role, such as the differences in size of the high an
low risk population (xL and xH ), differences in price sensitivity (￿H and ￿L ), differences
in selection sensitivity issues (￿H and ￿L) and the type of payment system of the
sponsor.
17
Besides perfect risk adjustment, there are several other policy options to reduce
selection activities for reasons of unpriced risk heterogeneity. Both, increasing21
retrospective equalization and compensation reduces the risk-type specific selection
strategies for insurance companies. This observation follows directly from equation (14)
and (15). A higher ￿ or ￿ diminishes the effect of imperfect risk adjustment by the
sponsor. Retrospective equalization equalizes risks across insurers and retrospective
compensation transfers part of the risk to the sponsor (and thus both options decrease
the marginal returns from selection). However, both policies may imply a mixed
blessing. As follows from equation (11), high values for ￿ and ￿  will diminish
efficiency activities by insurers. This marks the trade-off efficiency in production versus
selection, as indicated by Newhouse (1996).
4.3. The optimal rule for the community-rated premium.
The optimal rule for the community-rated premium is









        (16)
for i =1,...,N.
In (16) we distinguish the competition effect or mark-up  x/N(￿L xL+ ￿H xH )- ￿ and
costs wich are related to medical costs. The latter are represented in the third term in
(16). 
More sensitive consumers (higher ￿L and ￿H ) will intensify competition among
insurers which will lead to lower premiums. Scale effects play a role as well. If the
number of insurers increases, more competition will prevail and premiums will fall. If
insurers obtain more money by activities not related to medical care (see 3.4.), ￿ may
play a substantial role. If these activities are very profitable, and insurers receive for
each enrollee more money outside the medical insurance market, then the mark-up may
even become negative. 
The third term in (16) is related to the supply of health care. The more retrospective
compensation takes place (higher ￿), the higher are the retrospective payments the
insurer will receive from the sponsor and, thus, the lower the community-rated premium
needs to be. The costs are, furthermore, a weighted average of the net health care costs
of low and high risks, where the weight are proportional to ￿H xH and ￿LxL. To understand
this, consider for a moment the case where high risks are more price sensitive to
premium changes than low risks (￿H >￿L). Thus, a marginal reduction in the community-
rated premium will attract more high risks. Combine this with a case of imperfect risk-
adjustment where high risks are the bad risks ( ), then  a marginal reduction of ¯ z￿>¯ z￿22
the community-rated premium will be, relatively, less profitable for an insurer. As a
consequence the optimal community-rated premium will be relatively high in the Nash
equilibrium. Finally, the last term in the equation turns up because retrospective
equalization allows for cross subsidies between low and high risks. It depends on the
positiveness of the retrospective equalization parameter ￿. If we consider the similar
case as discussed before, then the community-rated premiums will be adjusted
downward since the relatively higher costs of the high risk population will, partly, be
equalized by other insurers. The main point of allowing cross-subsidies between high
and low risks is that it smoothes differences in total health care costs across insurers.
4.4. Insurer  profits
The profits of the insurer can be obtained by substituting the optimal outcomes (11)-(16)
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for i =1,...,N.
The amount of insurer profits depends on several effects. First, the number of
enrollees times the mark-up yields a part  of the profits. As a result, profits rise if the
number of enrollees per insurer rises. Also, if consumers are more price sensitive (high
and   in the first term) then competition among insurer intensifies and profits will L H
decline. Second, profits are affected if both hold: ￿  and risk adjustment is L H
imperfect. This is reflected in the third term between brackets. The ultimate effect of this
term depends upon a combination of different effects. For example, consider the case
where   and  < . In that case insurers are less eager to adjust premiums ¯ zH >¯ zL H L
downwards since lowering premiums will attract relatively more the loss-making high
risks. This effect leads to profits and becomes larger if asymmetry between the two
types of risks (in net costs, price sensitivity or population) increases.
Competition assures that selection investments return as costs in the insurer profit
function. Symmetry implies that there are no specific gains for an individual insurer
resulting from selection. In the model selection is a zero-sum game; all investments
finally result in a public loss.
In the profit function efficiency plays a similar role as selection. Efficiency costs
represent  investment costs which have to be paid by the insurer. Opposite to selection,
however, efficiency lowers total health care costs. In general, the reduction in health23
18 This is the case if risk-adjustment is perfect or ￿L = ￿H. Theoretically one can argue that this is a
rather extreme effect of the model. Competition assures that insurers receive no gains from efficiency. As
selection, efficiency activities are for the insurer ‘necessary’ losses to survive in the market. The reason for
this outcome lies in our assumption in equation (3); premiums are modelled linear and selection activities
are modelled as decreasing returns to scale. 
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care costs does not show up in the profits but is fully reflected in the premium and thus
all the proceeds of efficiency go to the consumers.
18
To get a better understanding of the model, it is also interesting to consider a simple
case where retrospective equalization and compensation is absent and ￿ = ￿L = ￿H . This
leads to the following expressions for the premium and profits:
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for i =1,...,N.
This case shows more clearly a general aspect of the model. Since all insurers are
symmetric, the premium of each consumer depends, besides a mark-up (the competition
effect), on a weighted average of the health care costs for low and high risks. The profits
for each insurer are simply the mark up per consumer times his number of enrollees
minus the costs for investments in efficiency and selection. If there are many insurers
and ￿ is relatively high then the mark up will be low.
4.5. Total consumer premiums
Total consumer premiums are
for i =1,...,N.                                                                                                                    
Each consumer has to pay a community-rated premium and a solidarity contribution
to the sponsor.24
The first term reflects the community-rated premium. The second and third term
reflect the prospective and retrospective payments to the sponsor. First, each consumer
contributes a proportional share, related to the number of high and low risks in the
population, of the prospective payments, µL and µH, to the sponsor. A similar share,
depending on the amount of retrospective compensation, is related with respect to net
health care costs.
5. Asymmetry, information and dynamics
The outcomes in the model are based on some important assumptions, such as symmetry
across insurers and full information of insurers. Also, the model is static; it does not
consider dynamic aspects. In the following three subsections we will explore some of
the possible consequences if we release these assumptions.
5.1. Retrospective equalization, compensation and asymmetry
The symmetric outcomes in the Nash equilibrium show that enlarging equalization
(increasing ￿) or enlarging retrospective compensation (increasing ￿) lowers efficiency
activities and, thus, raises health care costs and, thus, (individual and total) premiums.
The impact of retrospective compensation on total selection activities is fairly neutral.
Depending on the crookedness of the risk adjustment scheme, decreasing ￿ in equation
(14) and (15) implies that risk-type specific selection activities on low risks and high
risks alter, albeit in a different direction. The symmetry assumption, however, may leave
some important practical issues of the picture.
In the following example we will highlight the asymmetric consequences of
retrospective equalization and compensation. Consider a simple case where each insurer
i faces an equal number of enrollees. Assume that insurer i faces total costs,  , where ˆ zi
the  ‘s are mutually independent distributed with mean E( )=  and variance ˆ zi ˆ zi ˆ zi
VAR( )= ,  for  i=1,...,N. The mean costs across insurers differ. This reflects the idea ˆ zi ￿2
that insurers behave asymmetrically, due to for example different initial conditions, and
thus may face different health care costs. In the sequel we will only concentrate on the
consequences of retrospective equalization and compensation. Therefore, we substitute
the distributions in equation (6) and (7). This yields, after straightforward calculation,
that health care costs minus total sponsor subsidies for insurer i, are distributed with:
E(zib
￿￿
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19 Data in the Netherlands from recent years shows that a reduction in retrospective equalization and
compensation is correlated with an increasing variability in community-rated  premiums.
for i=1,...,N. 
From the Nash equilibrium of our model follows that health care costs for insurer i
diminish with (1-￿)(1-￿-￿/N). Since marginal efficiency activities are decreasing in the
intensity of behaviour, this results in lower efficiency activities if retrospective
equalization and compensation increase. Now compare the set of mean costs
 and the set of mean costs of insurers in (18). The asymmetric aspect of {zi,i1,...,N}
the example, however, shows that the set of mean costs in (18) becomes more dense.
Since health care costs of an insurer are likely to be closely related to the height of the
premium we expect that an increasing density in health care costs will be correlated with
an increasing density in premiums. This effect by itself is likely to weaken competition
across insurers. Another element is related to the variance. Reducing retrospective
equalization and compensation by the sponsor increases the variances in (18) and thus
raises the risk that insurers bare. 
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for  i=1,...,N. Note that since retrospective equalization is budget neutral, only
retrospective compensation has an impact on the mean costs that the sponsor bares. The
big difference between the variance in (18) and (19) is that the latter variance is divided
by N. Transposing risk from the sponsor to the insurers enlarges the risk for the
individual (risk averse) insurer (consumer). Indeed the sponsor pools the whole
population, whereas each individual insurer pools only a part of the population.
To conclude, the effect of reducing retrospective equalization and compensation on
premiums may be at least fourfold. First, reducing retrospective compensation implies
that part of the health care costs passes on to the insurer which will increase the
community-rated premiums. In the case of imperfect risk adjustment and different price
sensitive consumers this may exert an upward effect on total consumer premiums.
Second, as the Nash equilibrium also shows, it may exert a downward effect on
premiums since more efficiency activities may take place. Third, the variability of the
community-rated premium across insurers may increase. This observation follows from
the fact that reducing retrospective equalization and compensation makes the
distribution of mean health care costs of insurers less dense, which may result in
increasing variability in the community-rated premium.
19 Fourth, the consequences of
a rising risk by insurers (through the increasing variances) may be passed on to
consumers by adding a risk premium to the community-rated premium. 26
20 This is a challenge for future research. In Cutler and Reber (1998) the trade-off between competition
and adverse selection is explored more deeply.
5.2. Uncertainty and the role of information
The model is on the basis of full information of the insurer over the consumers, the
sponsor and the health care providers. The assumption of full information is, strictly
speaking, not necessary. The model also applies to the case where insurers, retrospec-
tively, make an assessment of the situation, using all relevant information, about the
consumers, the sponsor and the health care providers. On the basis of this assessment
insurers will select their optimal rules as discussed in section 4. Ex-post, however, it
may turn out that an insurer may have misjudged the situation. This misjudgement may
be caused by uncertainty or incomplete information about many factors, which include
misjudgement about the behaviour of  consumers, health care providers and sponsor.
Whereas the consequences of possible failures in risk adjustment are discussed
extensively in the literature (Newhouse (1996), Van de Ven and Ellis (2000)), the model
presents another argument about the information asymmetry between the insurer and the
sponsor. This is the argument of timing. The insurer has time to consider to invest in
efficiency activities after the sponsor has announced its rules for the prospective and
retrospective payments. Perfect risk adjustment by the sponsor now implies not only full
information at time of the announcement, but also full (forward looking) information
about the activities of the insurer in the future. In the following equation (which follows
directly from (10)) we present this aspect more sharply:
      {ˆ zH µH}  {ˆ zL µL} 
z0LL (1 )ˆ e γ  µLz0HH (1 )ˆ e γ  µH
      (20)
In order to perform perfect risk adjustment the sponsor should have knowledge, not only
about  ￿, ￿L and ￿H , but also on  . While in practice the sponsor may have some ˆ e
knowledge about the institutional characteristics of the insurer (the parameters ￿, ￿L and
￿H) obtained from the past, the information about possible efficiency activities ( ) will ˆ e
always be uncertain.
In the model insurers can also discriminate perfectly between high risk and low risk
consumers. However, elements of imperfect information of the insurer can be handled
within the model as well. If the insurer fails to identify consumers correctly, for example
due to adverse selection, this can be modelled by adding uncertainty to the model.
20
One problem which arises in practice is that it is often difficult to distinguish
between a situation where an insurer faces uncertainty or a situation where an insurer
produces inefficiently. While retrospective equalization and compensation are primarily27
21 This does only hold for those categories where these effects are most likely to take place. For example,
fixed costs of hospitals, such as capital costs, are often specified in long term contracts and thus difficult to
influence by the insurer. Therefore, for fixed costs in hospitals still a retrospective compensation parameter
of 0.95 applies in the Netherlands.
22 An example here is the Swiss health insurance market (see Beck (1999)). 
designed by the sponsor to subsidize the insurer in the former case, the sponsor also
subsidizes the insurer in the latter case. In the Netherlands there is now a growing
concern for this aspect which results in adjusting the equalization and compensation
parameter downwards.
21 Moreover, in the coming years, realised healthcare consump-
tion or costs in the previous year will be included as a risk adjuster in the formula that
defines prospective payments. This new policy has advantages. Since previous year
consumption, or healthcare costs, is highly correlated with this year’s costs, this may
imply a better match between prospective payments to insurers and their risk
characteristics. Inclusion of this variable may thus help to reduce the variability of
healthcare costs and, as a result, decrease the incentives for risk-selection behaviour.
However, this new policy may also reduce the incentives for efficiency behaviour. In
particular, the return on efficiency investments is low if insurers expect prospective
payments next year to decrease should they succeed in lowering healthcare costs this
year. This problem, however, is in essence a dynamic problem. This is the topic of our
next subsection.
5.3. Dynamics
The inclusion of dynamics in the underlying model may be important for several
reasons. Activities by insurers such as selection may have long term consequences. For
example, once bad risks enter an insurance pool they are likely to stay there for a long
time and, thus, may reduce profits for an insurance company over a longer period. This
is in contrast with general selection activities such as advertising where the long term
consequences are less clear. Long term consequences are likely to play a role in the
minds of insurers if they have to make a judgement between the consequences of putting
one unit of money into risk-type specific selection activities or into general selection
activities. Insurers who ignore this aspect may be saddled up with a pool of bad risks
and, finally, may even end up in bankruptcy.
22 
Another interesting aspect of dynamics is the yearly "game" between the sponsor and
the insurers.
Although insurers may have an information advantage when selecting their efficiency
activities after the sponsor has announced its new payment system for the coming year,
a problem for the insurers arises when the sponsor updates the risk formula every year.28
Insurers will realise that efficiency gains of a previous year will become incorporated
in the sponsor’s subsidies of next year. The underlying static model is not adequate to
foresee how the sponsor and insurers have to react optimally to this dynamic issue. The
most likely result is that insurers will diminish their efficiency activities in the current
year.
In a dynamic competitive environment, efficiency activities are only profitable if
individual insurer gains (investment profits minus investments costs) outweigh the gains
of other insurers. In the underlying Nash equilibrium, insurers invest in efficiency
activities if their gains outweigh their costs. However, due to the existence of efficiency
spill-overs in the health insurance markets it may happen in our model that, although a
single insurer makes profits from his efficiency activities, other insurers make more
profits. The insurers who obtain more profits may use these profits in the next period to
obtain a competitive advantage (e.g.by lowering the community-rated premiums). Thus,
while in our static model insurers are still willing to invest in efficiency activities they
may not do so in a dynamic model. This especially will be the case if spill-overs are
large. A phenomenon which is typically for an environment where consumers have free
rein in choosing their healthcare providers. To analyse these aspect more profoundly,
a dynamic model would be more appropriate here, but our first guess is that in a
dynamic context investments in efficiency in such an environment will be lower.
6. Conclusions
This paper has explored the economic effects of financing schemes for insurer activities.
The economic effects concern primarily health care institutions where consumers have
a large freedom of choice with respect to health care providers and insurers. These type
of situations apply for many countries in Europe and, by way of an example, we
consider in the paper the sickness funds in the Netherlands. The situation in the
Netherlands is particularly interesting since currently the government is implementing
health care policies which aim at increasing the risks of the insurers by cutting down on
various reimbursement schemes. The idea behind these policies is to create a more
efficient delivery of health care services by intensifying competition among health care
insurers.
We show that reimbursement schemes that foster the efficient delivery of medical
services may exert various effects on the premiums across insurers. The model shows
that premiums may fall, due to the efficient delivery of care. We discussed, however,
also the possibility that premiums may rise, since increasing the risk of individual
insurers may force them to include a risk premium. Effects on the premium related to
the heterogeneity of the population are found to be mixed. There may be an upward
effect on the premium if bad risks are more price-sensitive than good risks. If we release29
the symmetry assumption in our model then we expect that the variability of
community-rated premiums is likely to increase as well, since cutting down on the
reimbursement schemes emphasizes the differences in health care costs across insurers.
Another important finding of the paper is that transposing risk from the sponsor to
the insurer may increase risk-type specific selection activities of the insurer since bad
risks will be less profitable than good risks. The magnitude of this effect depends on the
quality of the risk  adjustment scheme and the degree of retrospective reimbursements
the government applies. Since, in practice, we are a long way from having a perfect risk
adjustment scheme we should be careful not to underplay the possible magnitude of
these effects. If risk adjustment is not perfect, risk-selection can be diminished by
introducing a certain amount of retrospective reimbursement. Both, retrospective
equalization en compensation will work. However, the higher the amount of retrospec-
tive reimbursement the lower  will be the incentives for efficiency behaviour of insurers.
The magnitude of risk-selection will also depend on the profitability of pursuing
efficient delivery of medical services. In situations where insurers have contracts with
almost all health care providers, a single insurer may find it very difficult to undertake
efficiency activities which only reduce its own health care costs while leaving health
care costs of his competitors untouched. Undertaking efficiency activities in a
competitive environment makes no sense if health care costs of other insurers would be
reduced in an equal (or higher) amount.
Our model shows that more competition is likely to reduce total health care costs,
premiums and insurer profits. Two opposite effects are related to the number of insurers.
One effect is that a larger number of insurers amounts to fewer efficiency and selection
activities, which results in higher community-rated premiums. The opposite effect is that
a larger number of insurers intensifies competition which exerts a downward effect on
the premium. More efficiency will take place but all the proceeds of efficiency will end
up with the consumers. Thus, in such a world, insurers will face higher efficiency and
selection costs and lower profits. 
Selection in the health care literature often pays only attention to risk-selection on
the basis of medical costs.  However, our model studies also the consequences of more
general forms of selection activities which are unrelated to medical costs, such as
advertising or improving insurer services. Our model shows that the amount of general
selection activities increases if the scale of the insurer increases, if consumers become
more sensitive to these types of selection activities, and if consumers  become less
sensitive to price. 
Interesting are also the results of the model related to the (price) sensitivity of
consumers. More price sensitive consumers will intensify competition among insurers
and thereby exert a downward pressure on the premium. Since insurers will more
concentrate on prices (premiums) they will reduce also the amount of selection activities
(due to the substitution effect between prices and selection). A policy which increases30
(price) sensitivity of consumers appears to be a sensible option. A word of caution is,
however, suggested here by the model as well. Policies which result in an overall
increase in the price sensitivity of all consumers are beneficial. However, policies that
only reach particular groups of the population may not have a desirable effect. The
model shows that if bad risks are more price sensitive than good risks, then a
sluggishness in adjusting premiums downward may be the undesired result. Insurers will
simply not be very eager to cut premiums since it will attract relatively more bad risks.
More empirical research is necessary to measure the importance of asymmetric price
sensitivity and how price elasticities are related to risk-selection activities by insurers.
Of course many important health care issues fall outside the scope of the theoretical
model. We mention two important issues. First, asymmetric information. Asymmetry
lurks everywhere, among insurers and between insurers and other players in the health
care field.  Second, dynamic issues. Dynamic issues are extremely important in health
care. The static model in this paper may be used as a  starting point for constructing a
dynamic model.
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Abstract
The efficient delivery of medical services may be pursued by intensifying competition
among health care insurers. This paper develops a model of regulated competition
among health care insurers. It shows that increasing competition may foster efficiency-
raising activities, reduce insurer profits and lower health care costs. However, it may
also increase the variability of consumer premiums and increase risk-type specific
selection activities by insurers as the government will generally lack information on the
risk characteristics of the insured.
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